1 October 2026
This Is Not an Energy Crisis. It Is an Energy System Crisis

Months into the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, governments are still turning to measures that ask people to use less fuel. But a resilient mobility system should not depend on asking people to move less whenever oil markets are disrupted.
When the world’s sixth-largest economy responds to an energy shock by asking citizens to reduce their fuel use, it signals a deeper issue that cannot be solved by limiting mobility. In May, as global oil prices surged, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called on people to conserve fuel, use public transport, carpool and work from home where possible, as part of a broader effort to reduce fuel consumption and protect the country’s foreign exchange reserves.
Such appeals are logical as emergency responses. However, they also reveal a deeper vulnerability: after decades of urban growth and transport investment, how resilient is a mobility system when the price and availability of the fuel it depends on can be shaped by events thousands of kilometres away?
India is not unique in this regard. In response to the disruption, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has recommended various measures to reduce oil demand, such as remote work, lower speed limits, and increased use of public transport. The IEA estimates that, at the national level, three additional remote-working days per week for eligible workers could reduce oil consumption from cars by 2–6%. Additionally, shifting travel from private cars to public transport could further reduce national oil use for cars by 1–3%. Several governments have implemented or promoted these measures during the current crisis.
However, the effects of the shock extend beyond individual behaviour. For example, in the Philippines, the government continues to provide fuel subsidies and other measures to protect public transport workers and commuters from elevated oil prices. In September, the Department of Energy reinstated a ₱12-per-litre fuel subsidy for eligible public utility vehicle drivers and operators, while additional government programmes support public transport and commuters affected by the conflict.
This issue is significant because fuel dependence is not experienced equally. For a household with a private car and the financial flexibility to absorb higher fuel costs, a price increase at the pump may be an inconvenience. For a bus driver, motorcycle courier, taxi driver or low-income commuter, it can determine whether a day’s work remains economically viable, whether a journey to work is affordable, or whether a household can absorb the rising transportation costs.
As a result, a global energy shock can become a public transport crisis, with costs eventually reaching passengers through higher fares, reduced services, or both. In the Philippines, the government’s continued intervention is a reminder that transport systems can transmit global oil-price volatility directly into people’s daily lives.
This is the logic of fossil fuel dependence expressed in its purest form: when the system is disrupted, the cost lands on those who had no role in designing it and often have the least resources to absorb it.
A SYSTEM FAILURE, NOT A SUPLY FAILURE
The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz did not create this vulnerability; instead, it revealed an existing systemic weakness.
Before the current disruption, around 20% of global oil consumption passed through the Strait each day, making it one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. When those flows were severely disrupted, the shock travelled through fuel markets, shipping, freight and household costs. The IEA describes the resulting disruption as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.
Several months later, the situation is more complex than a straightforward closure. Some oil flows have resumed, and producers have redirected exports via alternative routes. However, commercial vessel traffic remains significantly below pre-conflict levels. For example, on September 22, only two large commodity vessels crossed the Strait, compared to a pre-conflict average of approximately 125 per day. Meanwhile, oil shipments have continued, with Saudi Arabia increasing exports through the Strait following attacks that disrupted an alternative route.
The crisis has also required an extraordinary emergency response. In March, IEA member countries agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves, marking the largest coordinated stock release in the agency’s history. Additionally, governments have implemented fuel subsidies, price controls, and other forms of consumer support.
Such measures are necessary when people and economies are facing an immediate shock. But they do not change the underlying systemic vulnerability.
That vulnerability was already embedded in every diesel bus route, fuel-powered freight network and city designed on the assumption that imported oil would remain available and affordable. The crisis has made the cost of that assumption suddenly and simultaneously visible to everyone who cannot easily avoid it.
WHAT RESILIENCE ACTUALLY LOOKS LIKE
Solutions exist and are not new: what is missing is the scale and consistency of investment needed to make them the norm.
Public transport systems powered by renewable electricity are less exposed to oil price shocks. When buses and rail systems operate on domestically generated electricity, disruptions to oil flows in West Asia do not directly impact operations or operating costs.
Cities designed for proximity, where housing, employment, food, healthcare, and education are accessible without lengthy, fuel-dependent travel, are structurally less susceptible to energy volatility. Safe infrastructure for walking and cycling offers genuine alternatives to fuel-dependent vehicles, particularly for shorter trips.
Integrated, intermodal public transport networks that connect formal and informal services and address first- and last-mile needs can provide another layer of resilience. The objective is not simply to persuade people to choose a different mode when fuel becomes expensive, but to ensure that affordable and reliable alternatives are consistently available.
This distinction matters: asking people to work from home, use public transport or drive more slowly can reduce oil demand in an emergency, and the IEA’s current analysis shows that these measures can have a meaningful short-term impact. But emergency demand reduction is not the same as structural resilience.
A resilient mobility system is one in which people can continue to get to work, school, healthcare and essential services without their ability to move being determined by events thousands of kilometres away.
FROM EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO STRUCTURAL RESILIENCE
Governments will continue to need emergency measures when energy markets are disrupted. Maintaining strategic reserves, providing temporary subsidies, and supporting public transport workers and vulnerable households remain essential.
However, emergency relief cannot be the long-term foundation of a mobility system.
When governments repeatedly have to subsidise fuel, compensate transport operators or ask people to reduce their journeys in response to oil-price shocks, that is itself a signal that the underlying system remains exposed.
The response should therefore go beyond protecting today’s transport system and start focusing on transforming future mobility. That means investing in electric public transport fleets and the renewable energy infrastructure needed to power them. It means making walking and cycling safe and practical, so that people have genuine alternatives to fuel-dependent vehicles. And it means building cities around proximity and integrated transport, so that the distances people need to travel are themselves reduced, making mobility more affordable, sustainable and equitable regardless of what happens to the price of oil.
The lesson of Hormuz is not that people should simply move less, nor is it that emergency measures such as fuel subsidies or demand reduction are unnecessary. They are often essential in the short term.
The lesson is that a transport system cannot be considered resilient if its ability to function affordably depends on the uninterrupted availability of globally traded fossil fuels.
The workers, commuters and households bearing the costs of this crisis did not design the system that made them vulnerable. They should not be expected to carry the burden of its fragility every time an external shock hits.
Cities planned around people rather than vehicles, transport systems increasingly powered by energy communities can count on, and safe and affordable alternatives to private cars are not only climate solutions: they are infrastructure for resilience.
The next shock may come from another geopolitical conflict, another supply-chain disruption or another critical chokepoint, and the question is whether our transport systems will still be asking people to stay home when it arrives — or whether we will have built systems that allow people to keep moving.



